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Brady's Bunch of Flaws
Daniel S. Medwed*
Abstract
The 1970s television program The Brady Bunch provided a
lightheartedand optimistic portrayal of American family life. A divorced
man with three brown-haired boys married a divorced woman with three
blonde daughters. They melded together into a happy, well-adjusted crew
committed to mad-cap adventures accompanied by syrupy background
music. Yet the promise of The Brady Bunch was illusory. Divorce has
wreaked havoc on this country. The problems that derive from divorce and
remarriageare multifaceted; they seldom lend themselves to tidy resolution
in thirty minutes, let alone a lifetime. The show provided a distractionand a disservice. It sent an inaccurate message about the world to legions
of children suffering the painful consequences of divorce in their own
families.
In some respects, The Brady Bunch television show resembles the
federal constitutional doctrine requiring that prosecutors disclose
exculpatory evidence to defendants in criminal cases under Brady v.
Maryland The Supreme Court's Brady decision in 1963 offered hope that
prosecutors can straddle the fence between their two principal
responsibilities: To serve simultaneously as zealous advocates and neutral
"ministers of justice." By turning over all evidence that exculpates the
accused, prosecutors advance the cause of justice; by retaining all other
items of evidence, they safeguard andpromote their advocacy role. Brady
represented a marriage of two somewhat disparate images of the
prosecutorialfunction. But in the ensuing half-century the ideals of Brady
have not gained much traction in practice. Even worse, the doctrine as
presently constituted may provide a disservice to the very concept ofjustice.

*
Professor of Law, University of Utah-S.J. Qumnney College of Law. J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1995; B.A., Yale College, 1991. 1 am gratefuil to my friend and former
colleague Erik Luna for inviting me to participate in this symposium and to Chayce Clark
and Jennifer Ku for their helpful research assistance. Portions of this Article will appear in
my forthcoming book on the topic of prosecutors and wrongfuil convictions to be published
by New York University Press.
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This Article examines this state of affairs and puts forth some potential
solutions.
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I. Introduction
The 1970s television program The Brady Bunch provided a
lighthearted and optimistic portrayal of American family life. A divorced
man with three brown-haired boys married a divorced woman with three
blonde daughters. They melded together into a happy, well-adjusted crew
committed to mad-cap adventures accompanied by syrupy background
music. Although the family had its moments of tension, those incidents
were resolved favorably in the window of a standard half-hour comedy. I
loved watching The Brady Bunch during my childhood. I had a crush on
the actress Florence Henderson, the charming mother of the brood. As
someone with only one sibling, a brother, I envied the Brady boys. I had
always wanted a sister, better yet, three. And while I am not the product of
divorce, many of my friends are. The Brady Bunch supplied a pleasant,
almost utopian vision of life in divorce-ridden I1970s America, an image of
family interactions far removed from the blurrier, bleaker experiences of
my pals.
It strikes me that the promise of The Brady Bunch was illusory.
Divorce has wreaked havoc on this country. The problems that derive from
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divorce and remarriage are multifaceted; they seldom lend themselves to
tidy resolution in thirty minutes, let alone a lifetime. The show provided a
distraction-and a disservice. It sent an inaccurate message about the
world to legions of children suffering the painful consequences of divorce
in their own families.
In some respects, The Brady Bunch television show resembles the
federal constitutional doctrine that requires prosecutors to disclose
exculpatory evidence to defendants in criminal cases under Brady v.
Maryland.' The United States Supreme Court's Brady decision in 1963
offered hope that prosecutors can straddle the fence between their two
principal responsibilities: To serve simultaneously as zealous advocates

and neutral "ministers Of justice.",2

By turning over all evidence that

exculpates the accused, prosecutors advance the cause of justice; by
retaining all other items of evidence, they safeguard and promote their
advocacy role.3 Brady represented a marriage of two somewhat disparate
images of the prosecutorial function .4 But in the ensuing half-century the
ideals of Brady have not gained much traction in practice.5 Even worse, the
doctrine as presently constituted may provide a disservice to the very
concept of justice.
Given the international theme of this symposium, it is worth noting
that the United States fares poorly in comparison to many other countries'
approaches to discovery.6 When the Supreme Court handed down Brady, it
1. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.").
2. See Jane Campbell Moriarty, Misconvictions, Science, and the Minister of Justice,
86 NEB. L. REv. 1, 2 1-22 n. 117 (2008) (noting that American prosecutors' obligation to seek
justice is traceable as far back as George Sharwood's 1854 "An Essay on Professional
Ethics").
3. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (specifyiing that proper disclosure of information is
necessary because the role of the prosecutor is not only to convict criminals but to exonerate
the innocent).
4. See id. ("Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal
trials are fair.").
5. See Eugene Cerruti, Through the Looking-Glass at the Brady Doctrine: Some
New Reflections on White Queens, Hobgoblins, and Due Process, 94 Ky. L.J. 211, 211
(2006) (describing the Brady rule as a typically well-intentioned rule of criminal procedure
that "has never actually required the prosecutor to do what is so manifestly the right thing to
do").
6. See id. at 246 (contrasting the limited scope of Brady with the "transparent"
discovery process in civil law countries where both parties have access to the same files and
the "broad set of 'Brady rules' in foreign adversarial jurisdictions which have transformed
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elevated the United States above all other nations as the first to mandate the
disclosure of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors.7 Despite this head start,
much of the western world has outpaced the United States in the depth and
breadth of the discovery rights granted to criminal defendants.' This
Article examines this state of affairs and puts forth some potential solutions.
II. The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence: Theory and Practice
The United States Supreme Court has never recognized a general
constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases. 9 As a matter of federal
constitutional law, prosecutors are not even compelled to furnish the
defendant with the names of prosecution witnesses prior to trial, much less
disclose all of the police investigative information. 10 State and federal
discovery rules normally fill the void by providing defendants with the
statutory right to receive at least some of the evidence against them in
advance of trial. Even so, discovery rules tend to offer minimal solace to
defendants."' The scope of discovery in criminal cases is generally (and
2
bizarrely, given the stakes) narrower than that of civil cases.'1
There is one category of evidence to which criminal defendants are
constitutionally entitled prior to trial: Evidence that exculpates them from
the template for the duty of such disclosures").
7. See id. ("[Tlhe need for a rule specifically targeting the disclosure of exculpatory
information had not been recognized in any of the foreign common law or adversarial
jurisdictions.").
8. See id. at 246-74 (detailing the expansion of disclosure requirements for
exculpatory information in England, Canada, and within international courts and tribunals).
9. See Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must
Yield to New Realities, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 541, 561 ("There is no general constitutional right
to discovery in criminal cases." (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)));
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) ("There is no general constitutional right
to discovery in a criminal case and Brady did not create one. . . ."); Wardius v. Oregon, 412
U.S. 470, 474 (1973) ("[T]he Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of
discovery which the parties must be afforded. . .. ")
10. See FED. R. Caun. P. 16 (listing the information the government is required to
disclose upon request prior to trial, which does not include the names of the prosecution's
witnesses).
11. See Prosser, supra note 9, at 573-89 (discussing the inadequacy of preliminary
hearings and formal discovery mechanisms in providing defendants and defense counsel
with access to information).
12. Id. at 561, 573-94 (analyzing the scope of discovery in both civil and criminal
cases and determining that the scope of discovery is narrower in criminal cases due to the
limited mechanisms available to the defense and the often ambiguous disclosure obligations
placed on prosecutors).
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criminal charges."3 The Supreme Court held in Brady v. Marylandthat "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment."'14 A prosecutor's failure to abide by her disclosure obligations
under Brady is not subject to a good faith exception.'" Brady violations
exist "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.," 6 The
Brady obligation is also ongoing. If a Brady violation is found during the
course of trial, a mistrial may result.'" If it occurs after a guilty verdict, the
8
typical remedy is a new trial.'1
The Court later fleshed out the precise nature of this obligation in
several key ways beneficial to criminal defendants.' 9 First, it expanded the
scope of the Brady duty in Giglio v. United States to cover any materials
that could be used to show bias on the part of government witnesses, such
as information about promises, rewards, or inducements made in exchange
for their testimony or anything else that could impeach the credibility of
those witnesses on the stand.2 Second, the Court modified the Brady rule
13. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that, irrespective of the
good or bad faith of the prosecutor, due process requires disclosure of evidence material to
guilt or punishment).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.

17. See R. MICHAt.EL

CASSIDY, PROSECuToR-iAL ETHICS 72-73 (2005)

(noting that "if

the withheld evidence is discovered during the proceedings and a continuance cannot cure
any prejudice to the accused" courts will typically declare a mistrial).
18. See id. (differentiating between the consequences of a prosecutor violating the
constitutional disclosure obligation, which typically results in the court ordering a new trial,
and violations of prosecutors' ethical duty); Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor:

Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86

IOWA L. REv.

393, 431 (2001)

[hereinafter Davis, The American Prosecutor] (discussing a study that revealed 381
homicide convictions were overturned due to Brady violations between 1963 and 1999
(citing Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRit., Jan. 10,
199 1, at Al)).
19. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) (expanding the scope of
the Brady obligation to include evidence of witness credibility when "'reliability of a given
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence"' (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264, 269 (1959))); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) ("Impeachment
evidence, however, as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule." (citing
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154)); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976) (clarifying
that the disclosure requirement is not contingent on a specific request by the defendant);
United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11 th Cir. 1989) (expanding the scope of the
Brady obligation beyond the prosecutor and his immediate subordinates).
20. See CASSIDY, supra note 17, at 69 ("[Tjhe Court in Giglio v. United States
enlarged its construction of constitutionally 'exculpatory' evidence to encompass evidence
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by mandating that its disclosure requirements apply even without a specific
defense request. 2'1 Third, prosecutors must "timely" deliver Brady material
to allow the defendant to make effective use of the material at trial.2
Fourth, all exculpatory evidence possessed by law enforcement is classified
as Brady material regardless of whether the specific prosecutor in charge of
Simple constructive
the case has actual knowledge of its existence.2
knowledge suffices; evidence known only to the police is imputed to the
prosecutor under Brady.2 This suggests prosecutors have an affirmative
duty to learn about the evidence in the hands of their law enforcement
colleagues.2
States have followed the Supreme Court's constitutional lead 2. State
constitutional decisions, statutes, and rules fortify the Brady doctrine-and
even impose duties above and beyond it. 27 State ethical rules, in particular,
usually demand more from prosecutors in disclosing evidence than required
by federal constitutional law . 28 The American Bar Association's Model
which would demonstrate a witness's bias towards the government." (citing Giglio, 405 U.S.
at 155)); see also R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words ofHope:" Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses,
and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U. L. REV'. 1129, 1131 (2004) (discussing
the expansion of the mandatory disclosure requirement to include evidence of "a 'promise,
reward or inducement' to a government witness in a criminal case").
21. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976) (describing the type of
evidence that must be disclosed by a prosecutor without a specific request).
22. See CASSIDY, supra note 17, at 71-72 (comparing the constitutional timeliness
requirement with the undefined ethical timeliness standard).
23. See id at 74 ("Due process requires exculpatory evidence to be revealed whenever
it is 'possessed by the prosecutor or anyone over whom the prosecutor has authority."'
(quoting United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11Ith Cir. 1989))).
24. See id. (comparing prosecutors' duty not to turn a blind eye to potentially
exculpatory evidence with ABA Model Rule 3.8(d)'s requirement to disclose only evidence
actually known).
25. See Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical
Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTR-A L. REv. 275, 287 n.59 (2007) [hereinafter Davis, Legal
Profession 's Failure](noting that the individual prosecutor has an affirmative duty to tearn
about favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf, including
police) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995)); see also BENNETT L.
GERSHMAN', PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 231-34 (Thomson-West, 2d ed., 2007) (outlining
the prosecutors' obligation to obtain and disclose exculpatory information).
26. See CASSIDY, supra note 17, at 70 ("Following the lead of Brady, Rules of
Professional Conduct enacted in most states also impose an affirmative obligation on
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to the accused prior to trial.").
27. Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure
Obligations: Can Prosecutors' Offices Learn from Their Lawyers' Mistakes?, 31 CARnozo
L. REv. 2161, 2165 (2010).
28. See CASSIDY, supra note 17, at 70-71 ("[T~he use of the term 'tends' in Rule
3.8(d) and its predecessor, ABA Model Code provision DR 7-103(b), was likely intended to
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Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) is typical of these rules, requiring
prosecutors to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused or mitigates the offense.",29 Most states have adopted rules
consistent with Model Rule 3.8(d) by either mirroring or emulating the
"tends to negate guilt" construction of exculpatory evidence. 30 The use of
the verb "tends" in Rule 3.8(d) likely reflects a desire to create a disclosure
obligation even broader than that of Brady. 1
The optimism felt by criminal defendants in the aftermath of Brady

has been tempered by the application of this doctrine in practice . 32
prosecutors undoubtedly strive to fulfill their Brady obligations.3

Most

A great

many even bend over backwards to comply. 34 They do so for reasons both
ethical (to embody the minister-of-justice ideal) and practical (to avoid
eventual Brady controversies and to grease the wheels of the plea
bargaining process by nurturing a good reputation with the defense bar).3
In spite of these efforts, Brady violations take place with regularity.3
suggest a broader disclosure obligation than the 'materially exculpatory evidence' standard
of Brady and its progeny.").
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2008).
30. See CASSIDY, supra note 17, at 70-71 (comparing the use of "tends" in Rule 3.8(d)
with the phrase tends to negate guilt from Brady).
31. See id. at 70-71 ("[T]he use of the term 'tends' in Rule 3.8(d) and its predecessor,
ABA Model Code provision DR 7-103(b), was likely intended to suggest a broader
disclosure obligation than the 'materially exculpatory evidence' standard of Brady and its
progeny."); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (recognizing that prosecutors'
constitutional requirement illustrated by Brady and Bagley is less than the obligation under
professional ethics standards).
32. See Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and ConstitutionalMirages: The Tale of
Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. Rnv. 643, 647 (2002) (citing the Supreme Court's
increasingly narrow reading of "materiality" as the reason Brady's initial promise never
came to pass).
33. See Steven M. Dettelbach, Commentary:
Brady ftrm the Prosecutor's
Perspective, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 615, 615-16 (2007) (recalling a senior prosecutor who
instructed the author to remember that "[t]here is no case and no criminal that is worth your
integrity and your career").
34. See id. at 616 (positing that a fear of personal consequences leads prosecutors in
many jurisdictions to go above and beyond the minimum disclosure requirements).
35. See, e.g., Dettelbach, supra note 33, at 615-16 (recounting how young prosecutors
were encouraged by their supervisors to disclose exculpatory information); John G.
Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50
EMORY LIJ. 437, 457-60 (2001) (detailing the numerous advantages the people garner from
early disclosure of all available evidence).
36. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Pros~ecutin
Discipline Seriously, 8 D.C. L. R~v. 275, 278, 285 (2004) (detailing the results of wrongful
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Studies have pinpointed the suppression of exculpatory evidence as a factor
in many documented wrongful convictions later overturned by postIn some of those cases, prosecutors simply
conviction DNA testing.3
deemed the evidence not to be important. 8 In others, prosecutors eager to
secure convictions willfully bypassed the disclosure rules.3 9 Analyses of
wrongful convictions lacking DNA evidence further suggest that Brady
violations frequently contribute to the conviction of the innocent.4 Worst
of all, proven Brady errors hint at a larger problem because the vast
majority of suspect disclosure choices occur in the inner sanctuaries of
prosecutorial offices and never see the light of day.'
Given that the Brady obligation is broad, ongoing, and not limited by a
good faith exception, a certain number of violations are inevitable.4 But
the prospect of error is enhanced by the vagueness of the duty's doctrinal
formulation. How does a prosecutor figure out prior to trial whether
evidence is favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment?
Determining whether evidence is favorable to the accused does not pose
especially vexing problems in many cases. A much thornier issue, though,
concerns whether evidence is material to guilt or punishment.
The Supreme Court has cited the importance of the materiality prong
throughout much of its post-Brady jurisprudence, observing that the mere
withholding of exculpatory evidence does not rise to the level of a violation
unless it prejudices the defendant. 3 The Court clarified in United States v.
conviction studies in the United States).
37. See id. at 278 (noting that where prosecutorial misconduct was a factor in fortyfive percent of cases in one study, "[t]he vast majority of those instances were cases of
destruction or suppression of exculpatory evidence").
3 8. Id
39. Id. ("'[A] team of police and prosecutors were so convinced of their righteousness

that they were willing to do anything to get their man."' (quoting
NEUFIELD & Jimi DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 226-27 (2001))).

BARRY SCHECK, PETER

40. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. Rnv. 21, 23-24, 57 (1987) (citing data showing that
10% of 350 wrongful convictions studied involved suppression of evidence by prosecutors).
4 1. See, e.g., Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work A Proposalfor
Policing Prosecutors in Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Information to the
Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA L. RIEv. 303, 306-07 (2010) (stating that proving Brady violations
is difficult because the evidence is withheld from both the defense and the court).
42. See Davis, The American Prosecutor, supra note 18, at 431 ("Because the
obligation is expansive, continuing, and not limited by the good faith efforts of the
prosecutor, great potential for wrongdoing exists.").
43. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) ("A fair analysis of the
holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the
suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial.").
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Bagley in 1985 that evidence is "material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.""4 The materiality test hinges
on whether the defendant can prove that the absence of the evidence
undermines confidence in the verdict.4 In analyzing materiality, courts
often look at three factors: (1) the importance of the withheld evidence;
(2) the strength of the rest of the prosecution case; and (3) other sources of
evidence available to and used by the defense.46 The strength of the
prosecution's case is the central variable in the materiality calculus. The
stronger the government's case, the less likely it is that a particular item of
evidence will be construed as material.4
It is largely up to prosecutors alone to make decisions about the
materiality of a particular piece of evidence.4 Defense lawyers, for all their
incentives to find exculpatory information, usually lack the "time,
resources, or expertise" to conduct the type of massive pretrial investigation
When a prosecutor chooses not to
needed to ferret out this evidence.4
disclose evidence, that decision is seldom revealed to outsiders unless he

44. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see also Str-icler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (clarifying that a breach of the broad obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence is only a Brady violation if "there is a reasonable probability that the
suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict").
45. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (showing there is a "reasonable
probability" the result would have differed is sufficient to satisfy materiality) (citing Bagley,
473 U.S. at 678).
46. See CAssioY, supra note 17, at 74 (listing "(1) the importance of the evidence
withheld; (2) the strength of the government's case aside from the exculpatory material; and
(3) other sources of defense available and utilized by the defendant" as three issues typically
examined in order to determine materiality); GERSHMAN, supra note 25, at 221, 224-25.
Materiality is assessed based on the nondisclosed evidence in its entirety. Id. at 221 n.7.
Certain pieces of evidence are deemed so fundamental that their withholding constitutes
reversible error seemingly regardless of the strength of the government case. For example,
the Supreme Court has indicated that a police report showing that fingerprints on the murder
weapon exculpate the accused must be disclosed as a matter of "elemental fairness." Agurs,
427 U.S. at 110. Likewise, if one of two chief prosecution eyewitnesses were to inform the
police that the defendant was not the culprit, the prosecution's subsequent failure to turn
over that statement would mandate reversal. Id. at 112 n.2 1.
47. See GERSHMAN, supra note 25, at 222 ("When the government's proof is strong,
undisclosed evidence has less capacity to affect the verdict."); see also infra note 50 and
accompanying text (discussing various ways undisclosed evidence may be discovered).
48. See Davis, The American Prosecutor, supra note 18, at 432 (noting that
prosecutors make most disclosure decisions behind closed doors and defense attorneys are
ill-equipped to discover potentially material evidence in the prosecutor's possession).
49. Id.
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later has a change of heart or it somehow finds its way into defense hands.5 0
How do prosecutors go about making these decisions guided mainly by a
nebulous legal standard of materiality and an even more nebulous
obligation to do justice? Specifically, how is a prosecutor supposed to
apply the Brady materiality standard prospectively before any evidence has
been adduced or the defense strategy divulged at trial?
The tension between the prosecutor's dual role of zealous advocate
and minister of justice peaks in the context of Brady decisions, leaving the
prosecutor acutely vulnerable to cognitive bias.5 ' Alafair Burke points out
that the materiality test forces prosecutors to "engage in a bizarre kind of
anticipatory hindsight review" dependent on an artificial comparison of the
evidence and the as-of-yet unborn trial record.512 Cognitive biases can
prompt a prosecutor who has already charged the defendant with a crime
and is now conducting a pretrial materiality assessment to "engage in biased
recall, retrieving from memory only those facts that tend to confirm the

hypothesis Of gUilt.",53 The prosecutor may process information selectively,
undervaluing the potentially exculpatory evidence and overrating the
strength of the rest of the prosecution case.5 The inculpatory evidence
50.

Play, 57

See Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland:
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 531, 537 (2007)

Games Prosecutors

[hereinafter Gershman, Litigating] (listing

various ways undisclosed evidence may be discovered, including Freedom of Information
Act requests, independent investigation by defendants or their relatives, discovery during
post-trial motion hearings, and by chance).
51. See Alafair Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision-Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 Wm. & MARY L. Rrv. 1587, 1593-1601 (2006) [hereinafter Burke,
Lessons] (arguing that prosecutors are susceptible to cognitive bias that leads to imperfect
decision-making as a result of confirmation bias, selective information processing, belief
perseverance, and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance).
52. Id. at 1610; see also Alafair Burke, Commentary: Brady's Brainteaser: The
Accidental Prosecutor and Cognitive Bias, 57 CASE W. RES. L. Rnv. 575, 576 (2007)
("Brady requires a prosecutor, ex ante, to apply the same standard an appellate court would
use expost to decide whether to reverse a conviction.").
53. Burke, Lessons, supra note 51, at 1611; see also Alafair Burke, Revisiting
Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 INin. L.J. 481, 495 (2009) [hereinafter Burke, Revisiting]
(describing confirmation bias, "the well-documented tendency to favor evidence that
confirms one's working hypothesis," and why it likely affects a prosecutor's initial review of
a case file, causing potentially exculpatory information to be disregarded). In the words of
Justice Thurgood Marshall, "[g]iven this unharmonious role, it is not surprising that these
advocates oftentimes overlook or downplay potentially favorable evidence, often in cases in
which there is no doubt that the failure to disclose was a result of absolute good faith."
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 697 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. See Burke, Lessons, supra note 51, at 1611-12 (postulating that cognitive biases
will cause the prosecutor to "overestimate the strength of the government's case against the
defendant and underestimate the potential exculpatory value of the evidence whose
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takes on tremendous significance, the exculpatory evidence insignificance.
One's natural resistance to cognitive dissonance might also affect a
prosecutor's evaluation of the potential Brady evidence. 5 Having already
concluded that the defendant is likely guilty, a prosecutor might discount
the subsequent discovery of exculpatory information so as to shirk the
uncomfortable psychic reality that he may have charged an innocent person
with a crime.
Cognitive biases aside, the Brady materiality standard gives
prosecutors a wide berth to reach the outcome they want.5 If a prosecutor
withholds information to improve his chance of earning a conviction at
trial, he can rationalize that choice by weighing the evidence in a fashion
that suggests it is immaterial.5
And since this evaluation is entirely
prospective and thus theoretical, it is not subject to rigorous secondguessing from others, especially defense attorneys who may never even
know such a decision was made. 58
When Brady issues do come to light, the materiality test is a heavy
burden for a defendant to overcome on appeal. Appellate courts are fr~ugal
in doling out Brady reversals.5
One study by Bill Moushey of the
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette waded through 1,500 cases and determined that
prosecutors routinely withheld favorable evidence .60 Despite this high rate
disclosure is at issue"); Burke, Revisiting, supra note 53, at 495 ("Because of confirmation
bias, [the prosecutor] is likely to search the investigative file for evidence that confirms the
defendant's guilt to the detriment of any exculpatory evidence that might disprove the
working hypothesis.").
55. See Burke, Revisiting, supra note 53, at 495-96 ("To avoid the cognitive
dissonance of having to admit that she may have charged an innocent person, the prosecutor
is likely to discount the exculpatory value of the new evidence and overestimate the strength
of her original case against the defendant.").
56. See Burke, Lessons, supra note 51, at 1589-90 (summarizing the traditional
rationale for prosecutorial misconduct in the absence of cognitive bias).
57. See Sundby, supra note 32, at 651-52 (arguing that if the materiality standard is
taken literally the only situation in which a prosecutor should disclose Brady material is one
where there exists significant doubt that the prosecution should even proceed).
58. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 291 ("Except for the very limited cases, such as
knowing use of false testimony, prosecutors know that there is little, if any, remedy for
misconduct because the appellate standard of review is harmless error." (citation omnitted)).
59. See Davis, The American Prosecutor, supra note 18, at 431-32 (noting that in one
study of defendants exonerated by DNA tests none of the prosecutors who were found to
have engaged in misconduct were convicted of a crime or barred from practicing law).
60. See Bill Moushey, Win at All Costs: Out of Control, PY1rSBURGH POST-GAzET-rE,
Nov. 22 1998, at A-i ("Promises of lenient sentences and huge government checks
encourage criminals to lie on the witness stand. Prosecutors routinely withhold evidence that
might help prove a defendant innocent. Some federal agents work so closely with their
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of nondisclosure, appellate courts found reversible error in only a handful
of cases where the mistakes were so glaring, the conduct so heinous, that
judges had no other recourse .6 ' Another study found a reversal rate of less
than twelve percent of all cases involving Brady allegations decided in
2004.6 Even then, a reversal of a conviction on Brady grounds does not
spring open the prisoner's cell. It just entitles the defendant to a new trial
with the previously suppressed evidence now available.6
Scholars have repeatedly condemned Brady's materiality standard,
often on the premise that it all too easily empowers overzealous prosecutors
to engage in gamesmanship to dodge their obligations to disclose. 4 It
should not come as a surprise, then, that many calls for reform emphasize
"sticks" designed to beat back prosecutorial misconduct and nudge
prosecutors to disclose iffy Brady material.6 But focusing on bad actors
obscures the issue of good prosecutors who inexplicably under-disclose.
Accordingly, I will now put forth a number of possible remedies to address
both intentional misconduct and inadvertent lapses of judgment regarding
prosecutors' disclosure obligations.
11. Giving Brady Teeth: PunishingIntentional Misconduct
Disciplinary boards have shown a striking reticence to punish
prosecutors for even the most grievous of errors.6 6 The withholding of
undercover informants that they become lawbreakers themselves.").
61. See Davis, The American Prosecutor, supra note 18, at 432 ("He found that
prosecutors withheld evidence in hundreds of cases during the past decade, but that courts
overturned verdicts in only the most extreme cases.").
62. Burke, Revisiting, supra note 53, at 490 n.54.

63.

Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31

CARDozo L. REv.

2119, 2129

(2010) [hereinafter Burke, Talking].
64. See, e.g., Gershman, Litigating, supra note 50, at 538-42, 548-64 (outlining the
numerous methods prosecutors can use to altogether avoid or minimize the effects of
disclosing exculpatory evidence); Sundby, supra note 32, at 645 ("[f]t is the Court's
powers and
materiality decisions that essentially have robbed Brady of any pre-trial. ...
transformed the doctrine from a pre-trial discovery right into a post-trial remedy for
government misconduct.").
65. See Burke, Revisiting, supra note 53, at 488-93 (noting scholars have proposed
reforms that encourage prosecutors to place greater value on doing justice, advocate
increased enforcement of ethical rules, demand double jeopardy protection attach to
convictions reversed due to Brady violations, and even call for civil and criminal liability for
Brady violators).
66. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to PostConviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 173 (2004) (referencing a 1999 study
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exculpatory evidence is the most common-and most dangerous-form of
prosecutorial misconduct. The ethical rules governing the suppression of
exculpatory evidence are also the clearest and easiest to enforce within the
pantheon of oft-vague admonitions like the warning to "do justice. 6 fI
some jurisdictions, the canons of ethics give supervisory lawyers the task of
monitoring subordinates in prosecutors' offices to ensure compliance with
the disclosure rules.6 Those supervisors may be subject to discipline for
ordering, ratifying, or even failing to correct known discovery violations.6
Yet, disciplinary bodies hardly ever sanction prosecutors who
disregard Brady's precepts .70 Two decades ago, Richard Rosen studied the
of Illinois state court convictions that were reversed on appeal for prosecutorial misconduct
that revealed only two prosecutors out of 326 such cases were subject to sanctions, and none
were dismissed from the State's Attorney's Office); Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 278-80
(claiming that while there has not been a detailed study of the types and severity of errors
committed by prosecutors it is clear that few have been disciplined, even in cases where
prosecutors suppressed evidence in order to obtain death penalty convictions in capital
cases); Fred C. Zacharias, The ProfessionalDisciplineof Prosecutors,79 N.C. L. REv. 72 1,
722 (2001) ("Numerous commentators have reacted by noting the dearth of cases in which
disciplinary authorities have sanctioned prosecutors."). An exhaustive study by Professor
Fred Zacharias unearthed a "far from staggering" number of reported cases nationwide
(roughly 100) in which prosecutors had received discipline, and most of those were quite
dated. Id. at 744. Zacharias observes that "the body of cases is not entirely negligible,"
especially given its confinement to matters of public record. Id. at 743-45.
67. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L.
REv. 685, 723 (2006) thereinafter Gershman, Reflections] (explaining the reticence to
discipline prosecutors for Brady violations despite the contention that "the ethical rule
governing a prosecutor's suppression of evidence is the most explicit and easiest to
enforce"). This is not to say that ethical rules in the discovery area are perfect. In particular,
the rules could be far more explicit in requiring individual prosecutors to undertake a
diligent search for Brady material in law enforcement's possession. See Niki Kuckes, The
State of Rule 3.8: ProsecutorialEthics Reform Since Ethics 2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ErTHICS
427, 453-54 (2009) (attempting to bolster its ethical rules in this area, North Carolina now
requires that prosecutors make a "reasonably diligent inquiry" to locate potentially
exculpatory evidence).
68. See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON ETHIcs AND PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Am. BAR
AWsN, FORMAL OPINION 09-454, Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose Evidence and Information
Favorable to the Defense 8 (2009) [hereinafter ABA Op. 09-454] ("Any supervising lawyer
in the prosecutor's office and those lawyers with managerial responsibility are obligated to
ensure that subordinate lawyers comply with all their legal and ethical obligations" (citing
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5. 1(a) and (b))).
69. See id. at 8 ("Thus, supervisors who directly oversee trial prosecutors . . . are
subject to discipline for ordering, ratifying or knowingly failing to correct discovery
violations." (Citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(b))).
70. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutorsfor Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. Rnv. 693, 731 (1987) ("In light of the numerous
reported cases that contain evidence of intentional Brady-type misconduct, the instances of
discipline are too rare .... 1)
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entire volume of written disciplinary decisions and dug up only nine cases
in which a prosecutor had even been referred to the ethics board for
suppressing exculpatory evidence.'
Just one of those nine disciplinary
proceedings ended with a sanction, and merely a suspension at that."2
Rosen's research methodology included a survey sent to disciplinary
representatives in every state . 73 Thirty-five of the forty-one states that
responded to this query indicated that no formal complaints had ever been
filed alleging Brady-type misconduct.7
Joseph Weeks followed up on Rosen's research ten years later and
discovered a similar pattern. Weeks found seven cases where prosecutors
had been referred to disciplinary bodies for purported Brady violations.
Four of these referrals resulted in sanctions, the most severe of which was a
six-month suspension . 75 These findings about the paucity of discipline
imposed on prosecutors for Brady violations, even the rarity of allegations
themselves, are startling. Nothing suggests things have changed much in
recent years.7 On the contrary, data produced by groups across the country
suggest that disciplinary agencies stand idly by as the tide of Brady
violations, if not rising, continues unabated.7
One glaring example of disciplinary inaction took place in California
in 2010. A state appellate court determined in 2007 that an assistant
prosecutor in Tulare County, Phil Cline, had improperly withheld
audiotapes of interviews with state witnesses that pointed to the defendant's
innocence in a capital murder case from the 1980S. 78 The appellate judges
had listened to the tapes themselves. They came away from that experience
7 1. See id. at 730-3 1 (discussing the results of the survey).
72. Id. at73 1.
73. See id. at 696-97 (describing the background research that supplemented an
exhaustive review of available print records with surveys sent to the lawyer disciplinary
bodies of each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia).
74. Id.at730-31.

75.

See generally Joseph

R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy:

The Effective

Enforcement of the Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CiTy U. L. Rnv. 833
(1927).
76. See GERSHMAN, supra note 25, at 568 n.5 (detailing a U.S. Department of Justice
report from 1997 that showed that in hundreds of investigated cases of prosecutorial
misconduct none resulted in punishment from supervisors or sanctions from courts or bar
associations).
77. See, e.g., Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 278, 285 (detailing the results of wrongful
conviction studies in the United States).
78. Kathleen Ridolfi & Maurice Possley, Executive Summary:
A Study of
ProsecutorialMisconduct and Wrongful Conviction in Cali(fornia 3-5 (Aug. 2010) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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shocked by Cline's callous disregard for justice. The defendant in the case,
Mark Sodersten, had recently died after twenty-two years in prison, a fact
that ordinarily terminates or "abates" any lingering litigation in a criminal
case. Angered by the severity of Cline's misconduct, the court bypassed
the abatement principle and overturned the conviction .79 But the opinion
had no practical effect. Sodersten was dead, Cline went on practicing law.
Cline had even moved up the office ladder to chief prosecutor in 1992, and
voters had re-elected him ever since. With the appellate decision in hand,
Sodersten' s lawyer filed a complaint against Cline with the California State
Bar. Three years later, a bar official wrote a letter to the attorney
explaining that it was closing the investigation because it could not find
sufficient proof of wrongdoing. 0 Cline remains the district attorney in
Tulare County today.'
State disciplinary authorities are well-positioned in theory to sanction
prosecutors, considering that much of their work revolves around
investigating claims of lawyer misbehavior.8 The challenge lies in finding
ways to motivate ethics officials to take on prosecutors. An array of factors
explains why state disciplinary bodies rarely punish prosecutors for
misdeeds.8 Ethics investigations are normally instigated by the submission
of a formal complaint against a particular lawyer.8
The fact that
prosecutors represent "the People," and not a client per se, signifies that no
individual has a strong incentive for filing an ethics complaint against them,
except for criminal defendants whose cries of injustice are understandably
received with a dose of skepticism. 85 Instances of prosecutorial misconduct
7 9. Id.
8 0. Id.
81. Tulare County District Attorney, Welcome to the Office of the Tulare County
DistrictAttorney, http://www.da-tulareco.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
82. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (suggesting some avenues
already exist to sanction prosecutorial behavior by imposing criminal penalties).
83. See Zacharias, supra note 66, at 749-55 (identifying the unique character of the
prosecutor within the legal system as contributing in numerous ways to the dearth of
proceedings initiated against prosecutors by opposing counsel, courts, and professional
associations).
84. See id. at 749-50, 758 (noting that prosecutors lack traditional clients who are the
most likely party to bring an ethics complaint before a disciplinary body).
85. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrn. L. REv. 393, 445
(1992) [hereinafter Gershman, New Prosecutors] (listing the structure of ethics and
grievance committees, the prestige attached to the prosecutor's office, and the lack of a
private attorney-client relationship as reasons few ethics complaints are brought against
prosecutors). Criminal defendants may have the motivation to file formal complaints, but
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are also hard to detect. 86 Discretionary decisions by prosecutors, like
87
disclosure choices, usually occur in the interstices of the criminal process.
They are not made in courtrooms or during formal negotiations with
defense counsel, but behind closed doors far from the prying eyes of
defendants, judges, and state ethics boards.8 On those occasions where the
door blocking exposure to those decisions opens to outsiders, ethical codes
treat prosecutors deferentially, formulating generous boundaries for what
comprises a legitimate exercise of discretion.8 Moreover, the reluctance to
discipline prosecutors might be attributed in part to political
considerations.9" Ethics boards may fear blowback from prosecutors, many
of whom wield political clout.9 '
many lack the resources to pursue their claims with the tenacity needed to provide
substantiation. See Zacharias, supra note 66, at 749-50 ("Criminal defendants rarely have
incentives or resources to pursue complaints to the bar."). Criminal defense lawyers may
resist the temptation to file complaints against prosecutors because of the risk of alienating
common adversaries whom they will likely encounter in the fuiture and upon whom they
depend for favorable plea bargains and scheduling accommodations. Id.; see also
Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 295-96 (discussing a range of other explanations for the
reluctance of disciplinary agencies to sanction prosecutors, including resource constraints
and a lack of expertise in criminal justice ethics).
86. See Zacharias, supra note 66, at 758 (reasoning that because most complaints
against lawyers are brought by clients, the lack of traditional clients prevents prosecutors
from having their misconduct discovered).
87. See Gershman, New Prosecutors, supra note 85, at 435-36 (blaming the lack of
clearly articulated standards regulating prosecutorial conduct for creating "virtually
unlimited prosecutorial discretion").
88. See idt. at 407-08 (citing the lack of judicial review of the charging decision as an
example of unfettered prosecutorial discretion).
89. See id. at 445 (suggesting discipline committees are more familiar with and willing
to proceed against private attorneys); Zacharias, supra note 66, at 725 (comparing the
disparate treatment private attorneys and prosecutors receive from disciplinary bodies). It is
also quite possible that disciplinary agencies may be leery of pinpointing cases of
misconduct and interfering with what they perceive to be a role most appropriately played by
See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial
the judiciary.
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 977-78 (2009) ("Separation-of-powers concerns can
also make state authorities hesitate to intrude upon prosecutors' province."); Yaroshefsky,
supra note 36, at 293 ("[Djeference to the executive branch may reflect the view that the
separation-of-powers doctrine limits the authority of state disciplinary committees, which, as
arms of the judiciary, cannot control executive branch decision-making."); Zacharias, supra
note 66, at 754 ("[D]isciplinary authorities may be leery of interfering with, or having an
undue effect upon, the judicial process.").
90. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 292 ("[Pjerhaps the most significant reason for
the hands off approach to discipline of prosecutors[] is their political power and deference to
the executive branch.").
91. See Gershman, New Prosecutors, supra note 85, at 445 ("[A~s a governmental
figure of enormous power and prestige, the prosecutor is a person who professional bar
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In order for disciplinary -agencies to confront the issue of ill-advised
disclosure decisions, the underlying bases for those decisions must first
become public with greater regularity. Given the absence of likely
individual complainants against prosecutors, ethics boards should take a
more proactive stance toward investigating possible instances of
prosecutorial misbehavior that may surface through media reports and local
court opinions. 92 Also, requiring more extensive prosecutorial recordkeeping about discovery decisions would give ethics boards a greater
factual foundation upon which to evaluate and ultimately rest allegations of
misconduct.9
But providing ethics boards with increased access to
information about potential Brady violations will only help if ethics boards
are keen on disciplining prosecutors at a higher rate.94 How might one
convince these entities to drop their longstanding reluctance to punish
prosecutors?
Professor Angela Davis has proposed an intriguing reform: The
creation of discrete "Prosecution Review Boards" geared solely toward
Her ideal review
evaluating disciplinary claims involving prosecutors.9
board "would not only review specific complaints brought to its attention
by the public, but it would conduct random reviews of routine prosecution
decisions.",96 The board would investigate "bad practices" (in addition to
outright misconduct) and the random nature of its operation would assist in
organizations would not wish to alienate.'); Zacharias, supra note 66, at 761 (claiming that
disciplinary authorities may view investigating and sanctioning prosecutors as an invasion of
the executive branch). As Stephanos Bibas notes, it may also be that "bar authorities have
bigger fish to fry, such as blatant financial pilfering by civil lawyers." Bibas, supra note 89,
at 977.
92. See Zacharias, supra note 66, at 774 (arguing that proactive approaches to
discipline ought to be required of disciplinary agencies because of the "absence of likely
complainants").
93. See Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory
Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1379, 1385-1420
(2000) (observing the evolution of England's Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act,
1996, and a subsequent Police Code of Practice).
94. Cf Geoffrey S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liability for Supervising
Prosecutors: Applying the Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 BERKLEY J. CRimi. L. 395, 407 (2009) ("And even when
prosecutors commit a clear violation-for instance withholding exculpatory evidenceethics boards rarely impose discipline.").
95. See Davis, The American Prosecutor,supra note 18, at 463-64 ("Congress and
state legislatures should pass legislation establishing Prosecution Review Boards."); see also
Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 297-99 ("It is time to establish and fund independent
commlissions .. .. )
96. Davis, The American Prosecutor,supra note 18, at 463-64.
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deterring "arbitrary prosecution decisions." 97 Whether housed within a state
disciplinary body or constructed as a separate entity altogether, Davis's
A review board specializing in
suggestion deserves consideration.
prosecutorial behavior would soon assemble the expertise necessary to
penetrate the unique web of discretionary decisions by prosecutors.
Finding capable participants for prosecution review boards might prove
arduous, but strong candidates should emerge from the ranks of former
prosecutors and judges, distinguished retirees with the background (and the
backbone) to challenge prosecutors and little to lose by alienating the law
enforcement establishment.
A renewed focus by ethics organizations on punishing prosecutors,
like Phil Cline, for concealing exculpatory evidence would help deter the
most blatant types of misconduct. More abstractly, it would send a message
that these actions will not be tolerated by the bar. External regulation has a
profoundly positive effect on attorney behavior generally. 98 There is no
reason to doubt that more vigorous (and rigorous) supervision of
prosecutors by regulatory bodies could achieve similarly constructive
results. 9 9
Scholars have suggested various other sticks to goad prosecutors to
turn over evidence. The proposals include relaxing the strict principle of
absolute prosecutorial immunity from civil liability and criminalizing Brady
violations themselves.' 00 Simply convincing appellate courts to identify the
names of prosecutors who commit Brady violations in judicial opinions
might help.'0 ' Several intriguing suggestions involve punishing not the
prosecutor individually, but the prosecution's case as a whole by either
forbidding the government from retrying a defendant whose case is
reversed due to a Brady error or otherwise putting the government in a
97.
98.

Id.
See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful

Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89

B.U.L. REV. 1, 27

n. 111 (2009) ("[C]redible threats of malpractice liability have influenced lawyers'
conduct.").
99. See, e.g., id. ("The broad answer is that the potential for external regulation in
general has proven to be a positive influence upon lawyers.").
100. See Burke, Revisiting, supra note 53, at 491 nn.58-59 (arguing for increased
liability for Brady violations). The U.S. Supreme Court is examining the topic of
prosecutorial immunity and Brady violations this term in Connick v. Thompson. See
Connick v. Thompson, SCOTUS BLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/
connick-v-thompson (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
101. Adam Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce
ProsecutorialMisconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1059, 1069 (2009).
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worse position on retrial.102 Because sticks alone may be inadequate, some
commentators have endorsed carrots to incentivize prosecutors to comply
with Brady, such as the use of financial incentives to reward prosecutors for
03
abiding by their ethical duties.1
Although intentional Brady violations by bad actors are the exception
rather than the rule, the annals of criminal law are sufficiently rife with
anecdotes of this misbehavior to cause concern."04 Deterring prosecutors
from the deliberate suppression of Brady evidence, though, is not the
gravest danger in this area of criminal law. The most pressing problem
relates to how well-meaning prosecutors tend to interpret their
constitutional disclosure obligations in a way that all too often leads to
withholding.
IV. Office Policies and Practices
Some prosecutors' offices have responded to news of Brady violations
by beefing up their training and policies on disclosure. It is hard even for
the most fair-minded prosecutor to apply a doctrine dominated by the
muddled concept of materiality. One study of the Los Angeles District
Attorney's Office revealed that assistant prosecutors were often confused
about the scope of the Brady doctrine. This confusion was exacerbated by
supervisors who expressed wildly different opinions about how to
determine whether a piece of evidence was exculpatory. 0 That office now
102. See Burke, Revisiting, supra note 53, at 491 ("Still others have argued that as a
disincentive to the risk-taking that Brady currently encourages in prosecutors, the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy should prohibit the government from
retrying a defendant if his conviction is reversed because of a Brady violation."); Gurwitch,
supra note 41. at 322 (explaining how the current remedy under Brady calling for a new trial
fails to disadvantage the prosecution, while resulting in numerous disadvantages toward the
defendant); Janet C. Hoeffel, Pros~ecutorialDiscretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor
Meets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1133, 1152 (2005) ("[T]he court could order that, on
retrial, the defendant should get open discovery, or a deposition of the witness who was the
subject of the withheld information. The hope is that by putting the prosecutor in a worse
position on retrial, maybe he will reconsider the decision.").
103. See generally Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing
ProsecutorialDiscretion and Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 FORDH-Am L. Rcv. 851
(1995).
104. See Burke, Talking, supra note 63, at 2119 ("[S]tories of bad prosecutorial
decision-making in the cases against Genarlow Wilson, the Jena Six, and three Duke
lacrosse players are merely high-profile examples of prosecutorial misconduct. .. .)
105. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police Abuse:
The Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 305, 317 n.69 (2001) (citing an
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has a Brady Compliance Division to coordinate and publicize information
about the doctrine.106 Other prosecutorial agencies have followed suit by
implementing in-house disclosure training programs and drafting office
07
manuals that cover the topic.'
Internal training and guidelines to steer Brady decisions are admirable
reforms, especially if offices set up procedures to ensure that line
prosecutors actually follow these directives. Offices could issue disclosure
checklists for prosecutors to complete for each case, followed by the
random auditing of case files to test whether line prosecutors are using them
correctly.108 Decision-making research shows that people learn best from
their mistakes if they receive explicit feedback about when they succeeded
and when they failed.' 09 Standardizing a feedback process to analyze what
went wrong in poor Brady decisions would reinforce the use of disclosure
checklists, guidelines, and audits." 0 Critical to this type of program is
independent assessment of the Los Angeles police department conducted by Erwin
Chemerinsky); see also Prosser, supra note 9, at 569 ("If there is no working definition of
exculpatory evidence in their jurisdiction, or no training in their offices as to what to disclose
and how to make those decisions, they may well not appreciate what exculpatory evidence is
or recognize it when they learn of it.").
106. See Gershman, Reflections, supra note 67, at 687 n.10 (mentioning a special
directive from the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office).
107. It appears as if many, perhaps most, prosecutors' offices now have ample training
programs on Brady. See Gail Donaghue, Section 1983 Cases Arising from Criminal
Convictions, 18 Touno L. REv. 725, 731 (2002) (providing a sample discussion between the
participants involved). The Department of Justice announced discovery reforms for U.S.
Attorney's Offices in 2010. This announcement occurred after several much-publicized
discovery gaffes, among them the dismissal of federal criminal charges against Senator Ted
Stevens due to the failure to turn over Brady material. These incidents cast aspersions on
federal prosecutors. Among other initiatives, DOJ appointed a national criminal discovery
ombudsman to oversee internal education and vowed that discovery coordinators must
provide annual training in each office. Green, supra note 27, at 2161-63.
108. See generally New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations:
Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDozo L. REv. 1961 (2010).
109. Gordon Schiff, Voices from the Field: An Inter-Professional Approach to
Managing CriticalInformation, 31 CARDozo L. REv. 2037,2065 (2010).
1 10. Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need
Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDozo L. REv. 2215,
2216 (2010). Drawing upon practices in the medical field, Barry Scheck has proposed the
formation of Professional Integrity Programs within prosecutors' offices to oversee
disclosure. Scheck envisions:
checlists and disclosure conferences, the non-punitive tracking of errors and
"inear misses," the development of clear office-wide legal definitions of Brady
material, the administration of audits and root cause analysis ...and the creation
of simulation exercises for training staff that builds on the lessons learned from
liea misses'' and audits.
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convincing line prosecutors that higher-ups will not frown on late
disclosure of Brady material. Absent a better-late-than-never message from
the top brass, a prosecutor who does not turn over evidence at the outset has
an incentive to keep it buried."'
While these proposals resonate with me, I am less bullish on internal
regulation of disclosure duties than are many other observers." 2 My
pessimism does not come from distrust of prosecutors, or even doubts about
getting them to effectuate these changes,' 13 but rather from ambivalence
Providing more
about the Brady doctrine as currently formulated.
extensive education and fine-tuning office policy about what constitutes
Brady material will fall short because the doctrine defies easy explanation.
Its case-specific materiality analysis just does not lend itself to meaningful
guidelines.
V. Layers of Review
Conscientious prosecutors faced with nettlesome Brady issues would
benefit from presenting those issues to others through a formal review
structure. Internal fresh-look committees might assist in counteracting the
force of cognitive biases that can cause individual prosecutors to trivialize
potentially exculpatory evidence in their cases." 4 Even if similar reviews
already take place informally in many prosecutors' offices, those reviews
occur in haphazard fashion."' Institutionalizing the process would make
the practice routine as well as insert greater transparency and accountability
into Brady decision-making.

Id.; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor'sOffice, 31
CARDozo L. R~v.

2089, 2105-12 (2010) (discussing the compliance model's use in the

prosecutor's office); Green, supra note 27, at 2 171-72 (discussing why prosecutors might
"be skeptical about the prospects for learning from disclosure mistakes").
111. Scheck, supranote 110, at 2237-38.
112. See generally id
113. For some interesting and creative ideas about how to prompt prosecutors' offices
to adopt entity-level compliance programs, see Barkow, supra note 110, at 2112-18. As
Bruce Green points out, one challenge with disclosure review processes is how to avoid
motivating prosecutors to conceal their errors. Green, supra note 27, at 2183-84.
114. See Burke, Lessons, supra note 51, at 1626-31 (suggesting reforms for repairing
Brady).
115. See, e.g., Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Thoughts on the Ethical Culture of a Prosecutor's

Office,

84 WASH. L. REv.

11, 25 (2009) ("We also have ethics advisors, and when we have

tough cases and tough problems we run them by the advisors.").
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Some scholars have even called for judicial involvement in screening
prosecutors' Brady decisions during the discovery phase. 1 '6 One proposal
would require that at the time of pre-trial discovery the prosecutor submit
his full case file to the trial court or a magistrate for inspection." 7 The
independent adjudicator would have the authority to determine whether the
file has Brady evidence.'" 8 After the adjudicator reaches a decision, she
would notify the prosecutor about the information recommended for
disclosure." 9 At this point, the prosecutor could object.' 20 There is already
precedent for judicial involvement in the disclosure process. Massachusetts
state judges must hold pretrial conferences to confirm that all discovery
obligations have been met.'12 ' Asking courts to examine the evidence in
prosecutors' files is a logical outgrowth of the pretrial conference format.
Whatever the merits of adding secondary review structures to oversee
individual prosecutors' Brady decisions prior to trial (and there are many),
the reviewing bodies would still have to make the subjective determination
about whether favorable evidence is material to guilt or punishment before
the trial has occurred or the defense has even revealed its strategy. The
absence of information makes the process of weighing whether the
evidence would have a reasonable probability of affecting the trial outcome
purely speculative. In the end, the prospective assessment of materiality
mandated by Brady and its progeny is fundamentally flawed given its
vulnerability to cognitive bias even for those players-judges, prosecutorial
supervisors, and others-one step removed from the heat of litigation. It
may be time to rethink the very propriety of the materiality standard itself.
116. See Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs
Problem of ProsecutorialDiscretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FoRDHAm L. REv. 391,
427-28 (1984) (proposing a right to an in camera hearing at the time of pre-trial discovery);
see also Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
CriminalAdjudication, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1585, 1636-38 (2005) ("Pre-hearing judicial review
of the prosecutorial file forces disclosure to a player who can check executive-branch
judgment without raising concerns . . . .)
117. See Capra,supra note 116, at 427 ("Thiis proposal for a per se right to an in camera
inspection proceeds as follows: At the time of pre-trial discovery, the prosecutor must
submit his entire file on the case to the trial court or to a magistrate.").
118. See id. at 428 ("[T]he independent adjudicator shall detenmine whether, and to
what extent, the file contains information favorable to the defendant's preparation or
presentation of his defense.").
119. See id. ("Once a preliminary determination of favorability is made, the adjudicator
would notify the prosecutor of the information proposed for disclosure.").
120. See id. ("At this point the prosecutor could object to disclosure in whole or in
part. .. )
121. M1Ass. R. C~jIV. p.lil(a)(1) (2010).
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VI. Materiality Under the Microscope
In. trying to recast the doctrine to fulfill its early promise, let's start
with a look at whether Brady can be saved by modifying the materiality
test. The key question is how to calibrate the test to strike the proper
balance between a prosecutor's advocacy interests and the defendant's right
to a fair trial.
One solution might consist of amending the materiality standard to
make it easier for defendants to satisfy on appeal.12 2 Changing the test from
a reasonable probability of a different result to a reasonable possibility
would make it harder for prosecutors to justify withholding borderline
Brady information and less onerous for defendants to carry the burden of
subsequently proving a violation. New York has taken this approach in
certain Brady situations.' 2 3 Where a defendant in New York state court
makes a specific request for a piece of favorable evidence, nondisclosure of
that item will satisfy materiality so long as its presence would have created
24
only a reasonable possibility of a different result.1
Another potential reform is to flip the burden of proving materiality on
usually must
appeal from the defendant to the prosecution. 1'Defendants
the
outcome at
prove that the withholding of favorable evidence affected
trial. Courts instead could force prosecutors to show that the withholding
did not impact the verdict. New Hampshire has followed this course. In
1995, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the Brady test places
"too severe a burden" on criminal defendants, and chose as a matter of state
constitutional law to put the appellate burden on prosecutors to show "that
26
the undisclosed evidence would not have affected the verdict."1

See Christopher Deal, Brady Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty to
Right to a Trial by Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1780, 1790 n.57 (2007)
("Justice Stevens believed that this more lenient definition of materiality should apply.").
123. See generally People v. Fuentes, 907 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 2009).
124. See id. at 289 (explaining that when a document is requested by the defense,
failure to provide that document will result in the materiality standard being met if the court
can conclude that it was reasonably possible that the document could have changed the result
of the proceedings). For alleged Brady errors where there was no specific request, the test
remains reasonable probability. Id.
125. Several scholars have criticized the Supreme Court for neglecting to require that
prosecutors on appeal must prove that the nondisclosure of favorable evidence was not
material. After all, prosecutors typically bear the burden of proving that a constitutional
error, once established, was not harmless. Gershman, Reflections, supra note 67, at 713;
Hoeffel, supra note 102, at 1 144.
126. State v. Laurie, 653 A.2d 549, 552 (N.H. 1995).
122.

Disclose and the
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While altering the requirements of the materiality test itself and/or
shifting the burden of proof on appeal have advantages, the major drawback
lingers. Prosecutors would still undertake the "bizarre kind of anticipatory
hindsight review" described by Burke that allows selective information
processing, confirmation bias, and the aversion to cognitive dissonance to
flourish.12 7 Telling prosecutors to consider, prior to trial, whether evidence
that favors the defendant would have a reasonable possibility of affecting
the outcome is but a mild improvement over the reasonable probability
requirement. Many prosecutors might unconsciously perceive the evidence
so as to underrate the exculpatory information, overrate the inculpatory
evidence, and conclude that no reasonable possibility of a different result
exists. Other prosecutors might consciously subvert the modified standard
by interpreting it in a manner that supports withholding, as some observers
suggest is the case with the Current test. 28 Similarly, giving the burden of
proof on appeal to prosecutors would have minimal impact on the decision
to characterize evidence as material at the front end of the process.
In recognition of the difficulties that any formulation of the materiality
standard poses for all actors in the criminal justice systemi--prosecutors in
evaluating it prospectively, defendants (or even prosecutors) in overcoming
it retrospectively, courts in judging it from a distance-several scholars
want to discard that prong of Brady altogether.129 Prosecutors could simply
be required to disclose all favorable evidence in order to comply with due
process. 10A
prominent advocate of this view was Justice Thurgood
Marshall. His dissent in Bagley, the case that produced the present version
of the materiality standard, lobbied for a prosecutorial duty to turn over "all
information .. , that might reasonably be considered favorable to the
defendant's case."'13 ' In fact, well before Bagley and ensuing cases
developed the Court's materiality jurisprudence, the initial Brady decision
intimated that all relevant evidence favorable to the accused should be
127.
128.

Supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
See Gershman, Reflections, supra note 67, at 713 (discussing "a new standard of
materiality that in practice rendered suppression of favorable evidence by prosecutors a
routine and rationale act").
129. See Hoeffel, supra note 102, at 1151 (describing how some scholars, attempting to
envision effective solutions to the problems with Brady, noted that the courts could "create
better legal standards for the due process violation than those set as the floor in Bagley").
130. See, e.g., id. at 1151-52 ("The better standard would require that a due process
error occurs at trial if favorable information is withheld."); Sundby, supra note 32, at 661-63
("[T]he 'reasonably favorable' query would thus have presented a standard that would have
been far easier for the prosecutor to apply prior to trial.").
131. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 695-96 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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turned over. 132 With a duty to disclose all favorable evidence in place,
prosecutors would no longer need to speculate about how the evidence
might theoretically affect the outcome of a case. This vision of the
constitutional disclosure obligation would also more closely align it with
state ethical rules that demand disclosure of all evidence that "tends to
Some jurisdictions appear inclined to go in this
negate guilt." 13
34

direction.1

Nonetheless, shedding the materiality prong is not a complete solution.
Prosecutors would still have to determine whether the evidence is
favorable, a subjective evaluation that occurs prior to trial without full
Although this
access to information about the defense strategy.'
in
many cases, it
questions
complicated
not
pose
especially
may
assessment
Abandoning the
may occasionally produce some very tough calls.
materiality aspect of Brady therefore fails to cure the doctrine's ills
3

completely.1

1

MI.

Open File Discovery

The best way to guarantee that defendants obtain the exculpatory
evidence owed to them under Brady is to require "open file discovery"
where prosecutors must turn over all evidence known to the government,
exculpatory and inculpatory alike.'137 Some commentators have pushed for
a federal constitutional doctrine of open file discovery to realize Brady's
132. See Sundby, supra note 32, at 646-47 ("The Court's holding, therefore, while not
expressly embracing a relevance standard, was consistent with the idea that the exculpatory
evidence simply had to be relevant (and admissible) to be material.").
133. See, e.g., ABA Op. 09-454, supra note 68, at 2 ("Rule 3.8(d) does not implicitly
include the materiality limitation recognized in the constitutional case law. The rule requires
prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence so that the defense can decide on its utility.").
134. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 4 12(c) (adopting a court rule mandating that prosecutors
disclose evidence that "tends to negate the guilt of the accused").
135. See Burke, Revisiting, supra note 53, at 5 13-14 ("[It] still leaves them to
determine whether the evidence is favorable to the defense in the first instance. Because the
prosecutor is unaware of the facts known to the defense, or the defense's theory of the case,
she may fail to appreciate the favorability of evidence.").
136. See id. (presenting an example of how determining whether evidence is favorable
to the defense before trial can pose challenges for prosecutors). Cf. Sundby, supra note 32,
at 662 (suggesting that prosecutors would not struggle much if required only to disclose
evidence "reasonably favorable" to the accused).
137. See Burke, Revisiting, supra note 53, at 514 (proposing a system of "'open file'
discovery in which prosecutors disclose all evidence known to the government, whether it
seems to inculpate or exculpate").
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idealistic vision.138 Others have advocated a broadening of state and federal
discovery laws.'139 These suggestions reflect the idea that a prophylactic
rule of open file discovery is preferable to a case-specific standard like

Brady.140

Open file discovery certainly removes much of the subjectivity from
the equation.'14 1 Prosecutors would not have to engage in an artificial,
prospective assessment about how particular items of evidence fit within
the jigsaw puzzle of a possible trial; defendants would not have to clear the
virtually insurmountable hurdle of showing that the evidence would have
made a difference in the outcome; and appellate judges could shed the
42
chore of divining the importance of withheld evidence.1
Open file discovery more generally would level the playing field by
giving defendants a bird's eye view into the exact nature of the

138. See, e.g., id. at 514 nn.195-96 ("Several scholars have previously called for open
file discovery."); Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the
Disbarmentof Mike Nifong: The CriticalImportance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 257, 262 (2008) ("[T]he message of these cases is the paramount importance
of a broad and sure disclosure requirement in criminal cases.... .); Yaroshefsky, supra note
36, at 295 ("Changes in discovery obligations from less of a 'cat and mouse game' to
relatively open discovery would afford the true believer less opportunity to stretch ethical
boundaries .. .. ")
139. See Gershman, Reflections, supra note 67, at 725-28 ("Amending the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to impose strict and explicit disclosure requirements on
prosecutors might be one way to restore the promise of Brady v. Maryland."); Burke,
Revisiting, supra note 53, at 500 (noting that changing the rules of criminal procedure or
recognizing increased discovery rights under state constitutional law could certainly expand
discovery obligations but that either solution would "lack the sweeping impact of a change to
federal constitutional doctrine"); see, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Brady and JailhouseSnitches,
57 CASE W. RES. L. REv.

593, 604 (2007) (observing that the author encountered few Brady

issues during his stint as a lawyer in the military where the practice was to give the
usually at the same time").
prosecution and the defense "the same case file. ....
500-01
(advocating for a prophylactic rule
53,
at
supra
note
140. See Burke, Revisiting,
applicable to the Brady materiality standard).
141. See Peter J. Henning, The Pitffalls of Dealing with Witnesses in Public Corruption

Prosecutions, 23

GEO. J. LEGAL ErTucs

351, 366 n.61 (2010) ("The beauty of full open-file

discovery is obvious as a remedy for the difficulty of subjective choice in a competitive
adversarial environment. it does not require a prosecutor to make difficult discretionary
decisions.").
142. Cf Gilbert Stroud Merritt, Jr., ProsecutorialError in Death Penalty Cases, 76
TENN.. L. REV. 677, 684 (2009) ("Line prosecutors need to commit to disclosing favorable
evidence, without letting their subjective certainty about a defendant's guilt cloud their
judgment. Attorney generals [sic] have to be willing to confess error and grant new
Judges must enforce Brady doctrine without letting fear ...characterize [Brady
trials.
violations] . .. as immaterial.").
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government's case.143 The most obvious benefit of open file discoveryreducing the rate of wrongful convictions-would help restore faith in our
criminal justice system.'"4 A handful of states have implemented farMandating open file
reaching discovery regimes in recent yer. 4
discovery as a matter of federal due process, preferably in tandem with
related state discovery laws and ethics rules, could rekindle Brady's
flickering fifty-year-old flames.
Yet open file discovery is controversial. Opponents of the proposal
frequently contend that it goes too far. 146 Rather than leveling the playing
field, they suggest that compelling open file discovery would unduly shift
the balance of power in the criminal justice system in favor of the
defendant. 44' Another criticism is that open file discovery could invite
abuse by defendants who might intimidate witnesses or fabricate their
defense strategy in reaction to the evidence against them. 148 Judge Learned
Hand summarized these concerns about broad discovery rules nearly a
century ago:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While
the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the
barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question or comment
on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt
143. C( Giannelli, supra note 139, at 604 (emphasizing how the military approach of
both sides receiving the same case file and evidence at the same time illustrates that "[a]
better approach is expanded discovery rules").
144. See Gurwitch, supra note 41, at 304 ("Numerous commentators have questioned
whether the remedy, under current Brady jurisprudence, is sufficient to assure that wrongful
convictions are being avoided, individual defendants are receiving a fair trial, and that the
integrity of the criminal justice system is being protected.").
145. See Brown, supra note 116, at 1622-24 (observing the extent to which many states
have supplemented or extended the Brady requirements in recent years); Janice Morse,

Ohio's New Criminal Court Rules Kick In,

CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July

1, 2010 ("on July 1,

Ohio becomes an 'open-discovery' state.").
Rosario Reductionism and
146. See, e.g., Michael Lumer, People v. Jackson:
Collateral Attacks, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1229, 1287-88 n.290 (1994) ("It also may have been
that [Judge Bellacosa] advocated doing away with the per se standard completely, replacing
it perhaps with a [sic] open-file discovery process .... Such an extreme position may have
dissuaded other members of the bench from signing on to his opinions .... ".(emphasis
added)).
147. See Dettelbach, supra note 33, at 616-17 (noting that the materiality requirement
is partly a "self-defense mechanism" to protect prosecutors and rightful convictions from
creative defense attorneys and "armchair quarterbacking" by judges).

148.

See

RFcI-L&J

G. SINGER,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11:

FROM BAIL

TO JAIL 100

(Aspen

Publishers 2nd ed. 2008) ("Some defendants will destroy or alter evidence, intimidate or kill
witnesses, create fantasies of defense, etc.").
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in the minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should in
advance have the whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure.
49
and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see .'
Although these concerns have merit in theory, lessons learned from
jurisdictions that currently have broad discovery rules suggest these fears
are not borne out in practice. 50 And in some other jurisdictions,
prosecutors strive to disclose more evidence than required by law,
suggesting that open file practices might be in their best interest.' 5" The
voluntary enactment of open file discovery practices signals that a
particular prosecutor's office seeks transparency and burnishes its image as
an institution committed to fairness. 152 With greater faith in the goodwill of
their adversaries, defendants might embrace the notion of fair play and be
reluctant to instigate protracted discovery litigation for the sake of fishing
for some unknown delicacy in the deep blue sea of the prosecution's
54
files.153 Prosecutors can even benefit directly from open file discovery.1
Defendants who are fully aware of the strength of the case against them
might express greater willingness to accept plea bargains than those who
lack such insight. 1 5 If revealing sensitive information in the file could
endanger a witness or jeopardize a longstanding investigation, prosecutors
1 6
can always seek protective orders to prevent disclosure of that material.

149.
150.

U.S. v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
See Brown, supra note 116, at 1622-24 (articulating that although safety and

investigatory concerns are real, "those interests are not strong in most cases").
151. See Burke, Revisiting, supra note 53, at 515 ("Furthermore, many prosecutors
already voluntarily disclose more than Brady requires them to.").
152. See id. ("One advantage of open file discovery is that it reflects the commitment of
a prosecutor's office to transparency, which in turn promotes the appearance of prosecutorial
accountability and institutional fairness.").
153. See id. ("Those cases that do proceed to trial may be litigated more efficiently
because the defense attorney will have had an opportunity to identify the central issues in the
case prior to trial.").
154. See id. ("Open file discovery is also thought to bring more pragmatic advantages
[for prosecutors].").
155. See id. at 516 (discussing how strong evidence may create an incentive for the
defendant to plead guilty whereas weak evidence may encourage the defense to argue
persuasively for dismissal); Gershman, Litigating, supra note 50, at 543 ("An open file
arrangement may encourage defendants to plead guilty in the belief that having been fully
informed about the prosecution's case, they may assume that they will receive a favorable
bargain from a prosecutor who acts with integrity.").
156. See Burke, Revisiting, supra note 53, at 516 ("[A] rule mandating broad discovery
should contain an exception for cases in which disclosure would endanger witnesses,
interfere with an ongoing investigation, or otherwise jeopardize a governmental interest.").
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Note the experience with open file practices in Milwaukee. District
Attorney John Chisholm developed an extensive case screening and
diversion program to find alternatives to incarceration for low-risk
offenders. 5
Chisholm believed that early access to information by the
defense was vital to the success of this program. This caused him to
champion open file discovery. Not all of his assistants welcomed this idea.
Chisholm nevertheless plowed ahead, and in 2010 observed that open file
discovery in his office had facilitated guilty pleas and enriched relationships
58
with the defense bar.'1

For open file discovery to succeed on a large scale, however, there
must be mechanisms to enforce compliance. 5 9 Even without requiring
prosecutors to conduct the pretrial Brady materiality test that is so
susceptible to gamesmanship, prosecutors still control the open file
discovery process.160 They alone would have access to the precise contents
of their files.'16 ' Defendants can be lulled into a false sense of security in
jurisdictions with an open file discovery policy in place. 162 Several flagrant
Brady violations have occurred in cases where prosecutors alleged that they
maintained open file discovery, yet nonetheless withheld exculpatory

evidence.163

157. See Schiff, supra note 109, at 2074-77 (discussing John Chisholm's ideas about
"[hlow individuals are processed through the criminal justice system"); Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Foreword: New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really
Works?, 31 CARnozo L. R~v. 1943, 1951 (2010) ("Hon. John Chisholm provided an
overview of his office's effective and innovative strategies not only in disclosure, but also in
various community-based initiatives.").
158. Schiff, supra note 109, at 2074-77.
159. See Peter A. Joy, Brady and Jailhouse Informants: Responding to Injustice, 57
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 619, 641 (2007) ("Without guidelines on the exercise of discretion in
discovery, there is the potential for some prosecutors to use factors such as the race or social
standing of the defendant or the defendant's lawyer in determining who receives open file
discovery.").
160. See id. ("[W]hether a defendant receives the benefit 'of an open file policy may
depend on the particular prosecutor.. .."').
161. Cf id. at 641 n.99 ("Provided the material in the prosecutor's file is complete and
contains information compiled by all of the law enforcement personnel related to the case,
there cannot be any Brady material not disclosed. . . ." (emphasis added)).
162. See Tamara L. Graham, Death by Ambush: A Plea for Discovery of Evidence in
Aggravation, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 321, 345 (2005) ("Defense attorneys should not be lulled into a
false sense of the prosecution's case, even when granted discovery."); see also Gershman,
Litigating, supra note 50, at 544 ("Through the pretense of transparency, prosecutors have
the ability to not only withhold Brady evidence-as they may do in any case-but also by
suggesting that full disclosure has been made, forestall any further inquiry and, in fact,
change the nature of the defense.").
163. See Gershman, Litigating, supra note 50, at 544 ("[S]everal of the most egregious
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To be sure, open file discovery provides ample opportunities to game
Prosecutors can stretch the definition of sensitive
the system.'16 4
information beyond its logical boundary and refuse to disclose an array of
evidence under that purported justification.)6 5 Open file discovery might
also induce police and supervisory prosecutors to shield information from
the trial prosecutor or otherwise decline to reduce their knowledge to
writing in order to circumvent mandatory disclosure.16 6 Skeptical defense
67
lawyers have even derided some policies as "open empty file" policies.1
At the other end of the spectrum, prosecutors might over-disclose by
providing defense lawyers with a mountain of inscrutable material to sift
through.16 8 In one of the Enron financial fraud cases, the prosecutors' open
file discovery practice led them to turn over eighty million pages of
69
documents without identifyring or highlighting anything in particular .,
The behavior of Carmen Marino, the former chief prosecutor in
Cleveland, offers a cautionary tale about the limits of open file discovery
practices in individual prosecutors' offices.170 Marino "opened" his files by
asking his assistants to invite defense attorneys down to the office for a
conversation.'17 '1 During these meetings, prosecutors would read documents

Brady violations have been reported in cases where prosecutors represented that they
allegedly maintained an open file policy and had claimed to disclose everything in the file
relating to the case, including Brady evidence.'). Some offices lack a sweeping open file
discovery policy, but vest discretion in individual prosecutors to utilize this practice if they
wish. This means that the availability of open file discovery is often haphazard and subject
to the whims of individual prosecutors. See Joy, supra note 159, at 64 1.
164. See Gershman, Litigating, supra note 50, at 544 ("The opportunities for
gamesmanship under an open file policy are considerable.").
165. See Gurwitch, supra note 41, at 316 ("It seems apparent that a prosecutor who
makes a conscious decision to withhold exculpatory material from the defense is equally
likely to remove such information from the file before 'complying' with open file
discovery.").
166. See id. ("But if this statement was not reduced to writing, open file discovery
would play no role in assuring that the statement was provided to the defense.").
167. Green, supra note 27, at 2178.
168. See Gershman, Litigating, supra note 50, at 548 ("[A] variation of the open file
gambit ... [is] to overwhelm the defense with massive amounts of documents, including
items that may be potential Brady evidence, and that are virtually impossible to read and
digest in the limited time available for pretrial preparation.").
169. Id.
170. See id. at 547-48 ("As anybody who has followed Marino's prosecutorial career is
aware, he has been the subject of widespread criticism by courts and commentators for his
overzealous and unethical conduct.").
17 1. Id.
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aloud instead of allowing their adversaries to look at the files.'
73
Subsequent litigation showed that these meetings were often a sham .1
Cleveland prosecutors under Marino 's watch withheld critical exculpatory
material, including evidence that would have exonerated innocent
74
defendants in capital cases.1
VIII Ensuring the Openness of Open File Discovery
If open file discovery were adopted nationwide, how could one verify
that prosecutorial files are truly "open" to the defense? Vigilant oversight
of discovery practices by courts and ethics boards would surely help. But
greater supervision by these actors should be combined with reforms
designed to bolster the likelihood that the police will turn over evidence to
prosecutors in the first place. Frankly, without much evidence in their
possession, prosecutors honorably adhering to open file discovery do little
to benefit defendants. As noted above, information known only to the
police is attributed to the prosecution for Brady purposes., 7 5 This means
that prosecutors should root out exculpatory evidence from other law
enforcement officials.176 As noble as this component of the doctrine may
be, it ignores the practicalities of the relationship between the police and the
77
prosecution. Prosecutors are effectively at the mercy of the police.1
Police agencies operate independently from prosecutorial offices and
answer to different constituencies.17 8 Getting the police to turn over
exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor is not a matter of authority, but one
of negotiation and persuasion. 179 Prosecutors neither have information
about the contents of investigative files without police blessing nor wield
the explicit power to enable access to that material in the absence of such
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (referring to how prosecutors are liable
for what police withhold).
176. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (suggesting that prosecutors have an
affirmative duty to discover evidence in the hands of other law enforcement colleagues).
177. See Fisher, supra note 93, at 1384 (noting that if police 'cooperation is not
forthcoming, the prosecutor's ability to comply with Brady is fatally compromised").
178. See id. at 1382-83 (discussing how police are not under the authoritative thumb of
prosecutors).
179. See id. at 1383 (suggesting that obtaining this information requires the prosecutor
to motivate the police with the proverbial carrot more commonly than the stick).
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blessing. One entity that does have the power to pry open files, the
judiciary, seems unenthusiastic about monitoring police practices in the
discovery arena.
How might the police be convinced to turn over exculpatory evidence
consistently to the prosecution? Stanley Fisher recommends legislative
reform.'180 His statutory fixes would require the police to list and record all
relevant evidence, disclose those lists to the prosecution, and provide the
prosecution with entree to all investigative materials.'18 ' Fisher would
couple these reforms with measures to increase the probability of
compliance: drafing police forms to list pieces of evidence, offering
training, and designating particular police personnel as responsible for
aspects of the recordation and regulation process.'
This is a sensible
remedy, provided the United States has the political will to supervise police
83
activity in this way.'
As an alternative remedy, Fisher suggests changes to the ethical
rules.184 Fisher's proposed changes include the articulation of prosecutorial
duties to become familiar with police record-keeping procedures, to
promote uniform recordation by law enforcement, and to educate the police
about the importance of revealing specific categories of potentially
exculpatory evidence.' 8 ' Legislative changes or amendments to the ethical
rules surrounding prosecutors' obligations to learn about material in the
possession of the police would probably lead to the dissemination of more
86
evidence to the accused.1

Still, these reforms may not stymie one of the worst threats to the
success of open file discovery, which is not the reluctance of the police to
turn over exculpatory evidence to the prosecution, but their propensity
never to record such information at all.'187 Even when the police record
180. See id at 1385-1420 (using past English practices to create a plan for better police
involvement in the American judicial system).
18 1. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 1385 (lamenting the fact that America most probably lacks the political
will to bring about the appropriate changes).
184. See id. at 1424 (suggesting modification to the Model Rules and Prosecution
Function Standards).
185. See id. at 1423-24 (suggesting that the ABA modify Model Rule 3.8 and
Prosecution Function Standards 3-2.7 and 3-3.11 to reflect necessary changes for how
prosecutors relate to law enforcement investigators and guide them).
186. See id at 1425 ('The proposed amendments address the prosecutor's duty to
bridge the gap between what she knows and what she must know. .. .)
187. See Gurwitch, supra note 41, at 315-16 (declaring that statements not reduced to
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exculpatory information, that material might not be made available to the
prosecution. 18Before
ispractices were exposed in the late 1980s, the
Chicago Police Department employed a double-file system. Detectives
kept two sets of books: official files and shadow "street files." Absent
from the former, which were turned over to the prosecution, were any
89
number of exculpatory items dutifuilly recorded and retained in the latter.'1
Allowing the defense to depose prosecution witnesses in criminal
cases might alleviate the fear that information that is not recorded will
evade disclosure. Depositions are often used in civil cases by parties
seeking to interrogate opposing witnesses before the trial. 190 They help in
learning about the other side's case and in pinning witnesses down to their
accounts.' 9 ' In the criminal context, subjecting investigating officers to
depositions could prompt them to disclose information they failed to put
into writing yet might mention at trial.192 Deposing other prosecution
witnesses could generate information unknown even to law enforcement
that aids the defense. 19 3 Several states currently permit so-called "discovery
depositions" in criminal cases. 9 4 Some observers dislike these devices
because of the perception that they are costly and run the risk of abusing
witnesses.195 These concerns appear unfounded. Even assuming that
discovery depositions add incidental burdens to the criminal justice system,
their upside still greatly outweighs their downside. Increasing the use of
writing would not be subject to open file discovery and consequently would play no role in
assisting the defense).
188. As Stan Fisher points out, "[pjolice reports may mislead by misstating facts,
omitting facts, or a combination of both." Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts, Ma'am':
Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1,
6 (1993).
Fisher further explores how resource conservation, self-protection, and
partisanship conspire to motivate police to take a "minimalist approach" to drafting reports.
Id. at 8-9.
189. Id. at 36-38.
190. See Prosser, supra note 9, at 581 (discussing how civil cases allow a variety of
mechanisms, including deposition of witnesses, in order to discover relevant facts essential
to the case).
191. See id. at 607 ("Depositions allow questioning of prosecution and defense
witnesses .....
192. Id.
193. See id. at 612 ("EDlepositions provide an opportunity to discover evidence that is
not known to the police or to the prosecution, but that may be highly relevant to the case
against the defendant.").
194. See id. at 608-12 (discussing discovery rules in several states).
195. See id. at 613 ("Objections to criminal depositions are primarily those of cost and
abuse of witnesses.").
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depositions across the nation would enhance the truth-seeking function of
96
the discovery process by nicely supplementing open file practices.'
Finally, training prosecutors and creating an ethical culture within
prosecutorial agencies should go part and parcel with a movement toward
open file discovery. Although providing education for prosecutors about
Brady bears limited fruit in light of the inherent malleability and
subjectivity of the doctrine, training about open file discovery is much
easier: Simply instruct prosecutors to turn everything over unless an item
pnfl
might endanger a witness or impair a current investigation.'9
discovery rules do not rest entirely on the ethical judgment of a
Prosecutors have not proven
prosecutor-and for good reason. 19 8
99
themselves up to the task of reliably making the correct choice.'
IX Conclusion
The initial promise of the Brady doctrine has not been realized.
Various alterations, even alternatives to Brady must be considered to reach
its extraordinary potential to promote justice. Whether Brady remains
unchanged, experiences modifications, or is replaced with open file
discovery, decisions regarding the disclosure of evidence to the defense will
still depend to some extent on the ethical compasses of individual
prosecutors. Patrick Fitzgerald, now the United States Attorney in Chicago,
believes that "culture shapes behavior" in prosecutorial agencies. 0
Fitzgerald tries to hire people who already have good values and then train
them to be ethical lawyers .20 1 He looks for lawyers who upon finding
potentially exculpatory evidence while sitting alone in the office on a
Saturday before a Monday trial will turn it over without batting an eye.2 0
196. See id. at 612 ("Allowing depositions in criminal cases would address some of the
deficits of open file policies and of even the most liberal discovery rules.").
197. See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note 138, at 259-60 ("These cases in general ...show
the importance of concrete standards of conduct, such as an obligation to full disclosure.");
see also supra note 156 and accompanying text (noting that danger to witnesses should call
for exceptions to disclosure policies).
198. See Mosteller, supra note 138, at 260 (observing that open file discovery does not
"irely on the ethical judgment of a prosecutor involved in a fiercely competitive adversary
trial process to determine what is exculpatory").
199. See id. at 259-60 (observing that prosecutors have not shown themselves capable
of following the current standards set forth).
200. Fitzgerald, supra note 115, at 14.
201. See id at 14-16 ("An ethical culture starts with hiring.").
202. See id. (stating the qualities wanted in one of his attorneys); see also Bibas, supra
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The Dallas County District Attorney's office shares this view. That office
even sends case law on disclosure obligations to job applicants and tells
them to come to their interviews ready to discuss the ethics of disclosure. 0
Crafting disincentives to deter the withholding of evidence and incentives
to promote obedience to disclosure rules work on the outer edge of
prosecutorial behavior. Forming an ethical institutional environment where
disclosure is the accepted cultural norm works at the core.

note 89, at 963 ("Simply commanding ethical, consistent behavior is far less effective than
creating an environment that hires for, inculcates, expects, and rewards ethics and
consistency.").
203. Schiff, supra note 109, at 2072-73.

